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NOTES
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL
DECLARATIONS AS EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST
RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
The increasing number of statutes outlawing various forms of racial and
religious discrimination' and the recent international declarations against racial
r Fair employment practice acts prohibiting discrimination in private employment and
creating enforcement machinery were enacted in 1945 in New York and New Jersey, N.Y.
Executive Law (McKinney, 1945 Supp.) art. 12, §§ 125-136; N.J. Rev. Stat. (i945 Supp.)
tit. 18, § i8: 25-1 et seq. Within the last nine years numerous states have amended their
civil rights laws to enlarge the scope of prohibitions against discrimination in public accommodations: Conn. Gen. Stat. (I94i Supp.) § 8oo f.; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 38, §§ 125, 128a;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1945 Supp.) § 28. 341; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1944 Supp.) § 7321;
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1945 Supp.) tit. 10, § io: i-i et seq.; N.Y. Civil Rights Law (McKinney, 1945
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prejudice' suggest a possible method for challenging the legality of racial restrictive covenants. The argument that restrictive covenants should be invalidated
because they are hostile to a public policy evidenced by such statutes or declarations was made successfully in a recent Canadian case3 and was rejected in two
recent American decisions.4 The Ontario court invalidated a covenant which
provided "land not to be sold to Jews or persons of objectionable nationality."
The court found a public policy against racial discrimination not only in provincial statutes directed against other forms of discrimination but also in the
provisions of the Atlantic and United Nations Charters to which Canada was a
party.s New'Jersey and California courts refused to accept a similar argument
Supp.) art. 4, § 40; Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, I94o) § 12940; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1945 Supp.) tit. 18, § 4653; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 340.75.

In i945 Illinois created a special division in the Attorney General's Office to enforce the
civil rights law, Ill. Rev. Stat. (I94s) C.I4,§ 9.Since i94i several states have established
commissions to study the problems of racial discrimination and interracial relations: Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1943 Supp.) § 47og; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 127, § 214; Md. Ann. Code (Flack,
1945 Supp.) art. 49B, §§ i-3; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1945 Supp.) tit. i8, § 18-25-6.
Illinois has prohibited and penalized discrimination by any public official in the administration of his office or of public property of which he has charge, Ill. Rev. Stat. '(945) c. 38
§ 128k. Discrimination in hiring for public positions has been made illegal in Connecticut,
Conn. Gen. Stat. (x943 Supp.) § 426g, and New Jersey, N.J. Rev. Stat. (1945 Supp.) tit. 10,
§ io-i-i. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island have prohibited discrimination in
the administration of public assistance, Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1944 Supp.) C. 272 § 98B,
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945 Supp.) tit. 62, § 2513; 1944 Rhode Island Acts and Resolves,
C. 1505, § 22.

Other recent statutes prohibit discrimination in state-aided housing projects, N.Y. Public
Housing Law (McKinney, 1945 Supp.) art. ii,§ 223; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945 Supp.) tit.
I8A, § 1711; municipal hospitals, N.J. Rev. Stat. (i945 Supp.) tit. 30, § 30: 9-17; air-raid shelters, N.J. Rev. Stat. (i944 Supp.) sub-tit. 122A, § 2: 122A i et seq.; labor organizations; N.Y.

Civil Rights Law (McKinney, i945 Supp.) art. 4, § 43; state championship athletic contests,
N.Y. Civil Rights Law (McKinney, 1945 Supp.) art. 4, § 43; and in the issuance of insurance
policies, Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, i944 Supp.) c. 175, § ii3E; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1944
Supp.) §3766-I; N.Y. Insurance Law (McKinney, i94o) art. 9-A, § 209.
2See note 12, infra.
' In re Drummond Wren, [1945]4 D.L.R. 674.
4 Lion's HeadLake v. Bizezensky, 43 A. 2d 729 (Dist. Ct. N.J., 1945); Burkhardt v. Lofton,
63 Cal. App. 2d 230, 146 P. 2d 720 (i944).
sThe statutes and the pertinent provisions thereof cited by the court are as follows: "No
person shall-(a) publish or display or cause to be published or displayed or (b) permit to be
published or displayed on lands or premises or in a newspaper through a radio broadcasting
station or by means of any other medium which he owns or controls, any notice, sign, symbol,
emblem, or other representation indicating discrimination or an intention to discriminate
against any person or any class of persons for any purpose because of the race or creed of such
person or class of persons." 1944 Ont. Stat., C. 51. "Any licensed ensurer which discriminates
unfairly between risks within Ontario because of the race or religion of the ensured shall be
guilty of an offense." The Insurance Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. (i937) C. 256, § 99. "Every hall
erected under this Act shall be available for any public gathering of an educational, fraternal, religious or social nature or for the discussion of any public question and no organization shall be denied the use of the hall for religious, fraternal or political reasons." Regulations, § 6, passed pursuant to Community Halls Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. (1937) C. 284.
The court also held that the covenant was void as a restraint on alienation, and that the
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based upon statutes in their respective states. Other arguments against the
legality of restrictive covenants have not been successful in this country. The
Supreme Court has refused to reconsider Corriganv.Buckley 6 in which the Court
held that a racial restrictive covenant did not raise a constitutional question.7
Allegations that such covenants violate the rule against restraints upon alienation' or that they fail to meet technical requirements for enforcement have been
ineffective. 9 Pending a reconsideration of the Corrigan decision"' the "public
description "Jews or persons of objectionable nationality" was void for uncertainty. However,
these rulings were dearly secondary to the holding on the basis of public policy.
6 271 U.S. 323 (1925); see note io, infra.
7State courts frequently cite this case as authority for the rule that racial restrictive covenants are not in violation of constitutional guaranties. United Co-operative Realty Co. v.
Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563, io8 S.W. 2d 507 (9.37);
Ridgeway v. Cockburn, 143 Misc. 511, 296
N.Y. Supp. 936 (i937); Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269 Pac. 66o (1928); Stone v. Jones, 66 Cal.
App. 323, 152 P. 2d ig (x944); Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis. 389, 3 N.W. 2d 734 (1942). But Cf.
Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. i (C.C. Cal., 1892); see McGovney, Racial Residential
Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants, or Conditions
in Deeds Is Unconstitutional, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5 (i945).
8 See Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 722, 734-42 (1934);
Bowman, The Constitution and Common Law Restraints on Alienation, 8Boston U. L. Rev. i
(1928); Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitution and the
Rule against Restraints on Alienation, 21 Ill.
L. Rev. 704 (1927). Section 406, Comment L,
of the Restatement of Property (2944) states: "The avoidance of unpleasant racial and social
relations and the stabilization of the value of land which results from the enforcement of the
exclusion policy are regarded as outweighing the evils which normally result from a curtailment
of the power of alienation."
Those courts which hold that covenants prohibiting ownership by members of certain
races are invalid restraints upon alienation, invariably nullify such a rule by holding that
covenants which bar use and occupancy by members of a prohibited group do not violate the
rule against restraints on alienation. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 68o, x86
Pac. 5o6 (i929); Parmelee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922); Chandler v.Ziegler,
88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930); Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, x96 Atl. 330 (1938); cf.
Edwards v. West Woodridge Theatre Co., 55 F. 2d 524 (App. D.C., i93i).
9The technical gr6unds upon which discriminatory covenants have been resisted with
varying success are: (i) the required number of signatures was not obtained to give effect to
the covenant according to its terms, or that there was fraud in obtaining or reporting the required number of signatures, compare Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill.
App. 529 (1934), with Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (294o), reversing 372 Il.369, 24 N.E. 2d 37 (1939); cf. Foster v.
Stewart, 134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P. 2d 497 (i933); (2) failure to record, see Meade v. Dennistone,
173 Md. 295, 196 AtI. 330, 336 (2938); (3) change in character of occupancy in neighborhood
subsequent to covenant, Grady v. Garland, 89 F. 2d 817 (App. D.C., 1937); Mays v. Burgess,
252 F. 2d 123,124 (App. D.C., 1945); Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo. x66, 44 S.W. 2d 857 (2932);
Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. 2d 496 (1932); see 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1940);
(4)restrictions were not uniformly imposed on land in the immediate neighborhood, see Oberwise v. Poulos, 124 Cal. App. 247, 250, 12 P. 2d 156, 157 (2932); (5)occupancy or use by members of the prohibited group was in connection with governmental use of the land, compare
Gableman v. Dep't. of Conservation, 309 Mich. 415, 25 N.W. 2d 689 (1944) with Eason v.
Buffaloe, 198 N.C. 520, 152 S.E. 496 (293o); (6) covenant repugnant to grant of fee-simple
estate, White v. White, io8 W.Va. 135, 150 S.E. 531 (1929).
10The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in all restrictive covenant cases brought before
it since the Corrigan case. Cornish v. O'Donoghue, 30 F. 2d 983 (App. D.C., 1929), cert. de-
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policy" argument appears to represent the one device available to opponents of
restrictive covenants. Its endorsement by the Ontario court and its use in litigation in New Jersey and California suggest that attempts will be made to impress
other state courts with the validity of the Canadian court's reasoning."r
The United Nations Charter has been ratified as a treaty and is the law of
the land. The United States is also pledged to support the declarations contained in the resolution against discrimination accompanying the Act of Chapultepec. Both these documents contain unequivocal pledges to promote a
policy against racial and religious discrimination." However, an American
(1929); Russell v. Wallace, 3o F. 2d 98i (App. D.C., 1929), cert. denied
279 U.S. 871 (1929); Grady v. Garland, 89 F. 2d 817 (App. D.C., 1937), cert. denied 302 U.S.
694 (1937); Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869 (App. D.C., 1945), cert. denied 325 U.S. 868

nied 279 U.S. 871

(i945). Two justices were of the opinion that certiorari should be granted and two justices
took no part in the consideration or decision of this application. The fact that these cases all
arose inthe District of Columbia may account in part for the Court's refusal to grant certiorari.
It is doubtful if a decision in a District of Columbia case would settle constitutional issues any
more than did the Corrigan case, which also arose there. In the case of Harmon v. Tyler,
273 U.S. 668 (X926), the Court reversed aLouisiana case which had upheld the segregation of
colored people by means of powers of sale in land instruments, and in Hansberry v. Lee,
31" U.S. 32 (194o), the Court granted certiorari and reversed without remand when it might
have dismissed the application under the rule that ordinary res adjudicata is a matter of
local law for the state courts to determine. At least one state court assumed that the constitutional issue on restrictive covenants is an open one and decided that such covenants are
unconstitutional. In Anderson v. Auseth, Los Angeles Superior Court No. 484o8 (unreported,
decided December 6, i945) the court stated: "This court is of the opinion that it is time that
members of the Negro race are accorded without reservations and evasions, the full rights guaranteed them under the i4th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Judges have been avoiding the real issue for too long. Certainly there was no discrimination against the Negro race
when it came to calling upon its members to die on the battlefields in defense of this country
in the war just ended. The objections of the defendants to the introduction of testimony will be
sustained." Sustaining the objection to the introduction of evidence was equivalent to a
general demurrer to the complaint which sought to enforce a restrictive covenant.
11See Jones, Legality of Racial Restrictive Housing Covenants, 4 Nat'l Bar J. 14 (1946).
x2The following language occurs no less than five times in the United States Charter: "Universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The preamble of the Charter affirms the
faith of the peoples of the United Nations in fundamental human rights, in the diguity and
worth of the human person, and equal rights of the sexes. See text of the Charter, 13 Depart-

ment of State Bulletin "E9 (June 24, T945), also published in Department of State Publication 2353 (1945). The resolution against discrimination accompanying the Act of Chapultepec
was proposed by the Republic of Haiti; a similar resolution against discrimination on the basis
of sex was proposed by Mexico. Both resolutions were unanimously adopted by the Conference. N.Y. Times, p. 5,col. 6 (March 7, 1945).
The official American position on the discrimination and human rights provisions of the
United Nations Charter was summed up by former Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius,
Jr., as follows: "The United States Government will work actively and tirelessly, both for its
own people, and for peoples generally, toward the protection and promotion of these rights
and freedoms," 13 Department of State Bulletin 928 (May 20, 1945). While no official
steps have been taken by the American Government to adjust internal conditions to accord
with Charter provisions against discrimination, the Preparatory Commission of the United
Nations at London recommended an international bill of rights, and further international conventions or declarations for the prevention of discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language
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court which sought to employ these commitments in a restrictive covenant case
would be faced with difficulties. Constitutional limitations have been interpreted as preventing the use of the treaty-making power or the powers of the
President in foreign relations to effect internal changes which have no substantial relationship to international affairs.x3 It is accepted as inherent in the
federal system that the rules governing the transfer of land are to be determined
by the states.4 Thus, international declarations against discrimination cannot
be expected to do more than complement an existing state policy against enforcement of restrictive covenants. So long as the Corrigandecision is the law,
the major factor in the disposition of restrictive covenants will undoubtedly
remain the policy considerations of the various states.
In other fields of the law state courts have not been unwilling to infer a public
policy from related statutory or general constitutional materials in cases where
there are no statutes directly in point.s Most of the classic examples of this
technique appear in the field of contracts x6 Married women's property acts have
been invoked to support decisions affecting property and personal rights not
provided for by the legislature.7 A similar use has been made of bastardy stator religion and the protection of minorities. See McDiarmid, The Charter and the Promotion
of Human Rights, 14 Department of State Bulletin 21o, 212, 222 (Feb. IO,1946).
1 Roca v. Thompson, 232 U.S. 318 (x914); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914);
Compagnie Frangaise v. State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902); Heim v. McCall, 239
U.S. 175 ('915); see Missouriv. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,432-35 (z919); ProceedingsAm. Society
of Int'l Law, i94-96 (1929); 2 Hyde, International Law 1397 (2d rev. ed., I945); James Parker
Hall, State Interference with the Enforcement of Treaties, 7 Proceedings, Academy of Political
Science 548 (1917); ibid., Discussion by Henry St. George Tucker 582-85. Cf. Gandolfo v.
Hartman, 49 Fed. I81 (C.C. Cal., 1892) where a covenant prohibiting occupancy by Chinese
was held not only unconstitutional but in violation of a treaty between the United States and
China and therefore unenforceable. The Gandolfo case, perhaps the earliest restrictive covenant case, was not mentioned by the court in the Corrigan case, and has been generally overlooked in restrictive covenant cases although often mentioned by commentators. It has been
contended that race discrimination in any form can no longer be considered the purely internal
concern of the country in which it occurs. McDiarmid, op. cit. supra, note io, at 222. Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., p. 6 (Nov. 28, 19 44); ibid., pp. 4, 5 (Dec. 2,
1944).
14 Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 291 (1832); Case v. Kelly, 133 U.S. 21, 23 (I89o); Port of
Seattle v. Oregon & W. R. Co., 255 U.S. 56 (1921); see Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 18

(1842).

is See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, Harvard Legal Essays 213 (1934).
x6 See 5 Williston, Contracts § 1628 (rev. ed., 1937); Winfield, Public Policy in the English
Common Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 76 (1928); Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 Col. L.
Rev. 678 (i935); Pollock, Contracts 350 (ioth ed., 1936).

17Aaby v. Citizens National Bank, 197 Wis. 56, 221 N.W. 417 (1928) (holding that married women's acts have destroyed the estate of tenancies by the entirety, because the former
incapacity of the wife to hold by moieties was removed by the legislation); Donegan v. Donegan, io3 Ala. 488, 15 So. 823 (1894). Contra, Morrill v. Morrill, 138 Mich. 112, lor N.W. 209
(i9o4). See i Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relationships §§ 82,
130-31 (6th ed., 1921). For collection of cases utilizing the acts as a basis of changes in the
common-law rules as to torts between spouses see McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1O3O (193o); cf. Dalton v. People 68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37
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utes, 5 wrongful death statutes, x9 uniform commercial acts,20 and fair trade legis-

lation." In the absence of any legislation, the invasion of the right of privacy
has been held to be actionable because of a provision in the state constitution
guaranteeing to every person the right to the pursuit of happiness."2
Thus the inference of a public policy from legislation only indirectly related
to the issue in dispute is a well known technique in American jurisdictions.
Previous to the New Jersey and California cases, however, there were only a
few cases in which this technique was suggested as a method for resolving disputes over racial restrictive covenants. In 1914 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina invalidated, solely on the ground of public policy, a municipal ordinance which made it unlawful for Negroes to reside on a street where the
majority of houses were occupied by whites, or for whites to reside.where
Negroes were in a majority. 3 The court held the ordinance contrary to the
policy of the state, which it inferred from a statute enacted a few years previously when "labor agents began carrying out of the state colored laborers on
whom many farmers depended for the cultivation of their crops which alone
maintained the value of their lands." The statute made it an indictable offense
to act as a labor agent without first obtaining a license. The court said that the
policy reflected in the statute was to encourage the continued residence of
Negroes, whereas the ordinance, if enforced, might tend to drive some of them
out of the state. 4In Corriganv. Buckley,'5 the Court of Appeals of the District of
(1920) which swept away the common-law rule that a husband and wife could not be convicted
of conspiracy, on the basis of the economic separation of the spouses provided for in the Married
Women's Property Act.
18Landis, op. cit. supra, note iS, at 224.
'9 In Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 68 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545 (1914) the court permitted an
illegitimate offspring to recover as "child" under provision of wrongful-death statute; Marshall
v. Wabash R. Co., 120 Mo. 275, 25 S.W. 179 (1894); Thompson v. Delaware, L. & W. R.

Co., 41 Pa. Super. Ct. 617 (igio); cf. Bell v. Terry &Trench Co., 177 App. Div. 123, 163, N.Y.
Supp. 733 (1917). Contra: Robinson v. Ga. R. & Banking Co., 117 Ga. i68, 43 S.E. 452

State v. Hagerstown & Frederick R. Co., .39 Md. 78, i4 Atl. 729 (192r).
318 Ill. 432, 149 N.E. 225 (1925) where the court held that
the Uniform Sales Act recognized conditional-sales contracts and thus permitted the court to
depart from its earlier decisions to hold in accordance with the majority of courts on a point
with respect to conditional-sales contracts not expressly covered in the Uniform Sales Act;
Howard National Bank v. Wilson, 96 Vt. 438, 12o Atl. 889 (i9z3) (Uniform Bills of Lading and
Warehouse Receipts Acts employed as illustrating a policy applicable to a neogtiable-instrument case not expressly covered by the Negotiable Instruments Law).
21See 43 Harv. L. Rev. 945 (1930).
-Melvin v. Reid, 297 Pac. 91 (Cal. App., X931); cf. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
(1902);

20 Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Long,

Co.,
23

Ga. 19o, 5o S.E. 68 (19o5); Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 3o R.I. 13, 73 At. 97 (1909).
State v. Darnell, 166 N.C. 3oo, 8i S.E. 338 (1914).

24

This case soon became obsolete due to the decision in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o

122

(19I7), holding racial zoning by municipalities unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment; see Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 217 N.C. rig, 6 S.E. 2d 867 (1940).
"S 299 Fed. 899 (App., D.C., 1924).
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in statutes and judicial opinions a policy supporting restrictive
Columbia found
26

covenants.

One obvious reason for the failure to make general use of this approach to restrictive covenants lies in the complete lack of any public policy against racial
discrimination in many states. 7 Undoubtedly, a further explanation for the
hesitation to use the policy argument has been the general misconception concerning the Supreme Court's decision in the Corrigancase. The Court dismissed
the appeal from the appellate court's decision on the ground that a covenant
against Negro ownership in a District of Columbia neighborhood did not present constitutional or statutory questions sufficiently substantial to give it jurisdiction under the provisions of the Judicial Code. The Court carefully pointed
out that it was not passing on the arguments that the covenant violated public
policy and was of such a discriminatory character that a court of equity would
not enforce it. 2" Nevertheless, subsequent cases have cited the Corrigandecision
29
for the rule that such covenants are legally valid and enforceable in equity.

Frequently the courts have added that the covenant did not violate public
policy without discussion of the point.30
Where legislation directed against other forms of discrimination does exist it
is still questionable whether the technique employed by the Ontario court and
accepted by American courts in other litigation should be employed. In Lion's
Head Lake v. Bizezensky3' the New Jersey court, in refusing to hold a restrictive covenant void as contrary to public policy, observed that the legislature
had declared the public policy of the state against discriminatory practices in
respect to many and varied subjects, among them jury service, hospitals, fair
26 The court relied mainly upon state statutes providing for segregation of Negroes in common carriers and schools and the decisions which supported these statutes, particularly Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (i896), and Berea College v. Kentucky 211 U.S. 45 (1908). It is
arguable that it is generally more difficult to infer a public policy hostile to a contract than it
is to find a policy supporting a particular contract.
27 Compare the following statutes with those cited in note 1, supra: 1943 Texas L. p. 651-52
(separate accommodations on motorbuses); 1943 Texas L. p. i9ig (equal privileges to all persons of the Caucasian race); 1943 Ark. L. p. 235 (requiring designation of race in divorce com-

plaints, etc.); 1939 Ark. L. p. 170 (poll-tax lists to show color of person paying); 1937 Ark. L.
p. 826-27 (separation of races at horse racing tracks); 1944 Miss. L. p. 565 (segregation of
races at state penitentiary); 1937 S.C.L. p. i54-55 (segregation of races in trains and steam
ferries); 1939 N.C. Pub. L. p. 165-66 c. 147 (separate accommodations on street cars and

buses).
28 orrigan v. Buckley,

271

U.S.

323, 332 (1926).

29Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okla. 567, 133 P. 2d 555 (1942), Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App.
S.W. 2d 529 (1938); Steward v. Cronan, 105 Coo. 393, 98 P. 2d 999 (i94o); see also

1150, 11 5

cases cited note 30, infra.
30 See

Helmsley v. Sage, 194 Okla. 669,154 P. 2d 577 (i944); Parmalee v. Morris,

218

Mich.

625, 628, 188 N.W. 330,331 (1928); Ridgeway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 513, 296 N.Y. Supp.
936, 941 (1937); Chandler v. Ziegler, 98 Colo. I, 5, 291 Pac. 822, 824 (1930); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 585, 205 S.W. 217, 220 (1918); Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 309, 196
Atl. 330, 336 (1938).
3

43 A. 2d

729

(Dist. Ct. N.J., 1945).
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employment practices, schools and employment in defense industries. The legislature had not, however, "yet declared that restrictions governing ownership
and occupancy of private property should be forbidden or eliminated. Until the
legislature, the supreme law-making power, acts in the matter it is not within
the power or competency of the courts to do so."32 In Burkhardt v. Lofton,33 the
California court refused to find a public policy hostile to racial restrictive
covenants in the California Civil Rights Code. The court said:
The responsibility of striking down the validity of racial restrictive covenants with
respect to the use and occupancy of real property is one which no court or judge should
assume on the strength of individual theories as to what constitutes the "present" public policy on the subject or of personal belief that the consequences would be for the
general good.
The reasoning of the New Jersey and California courts appears sound. If
related statutes are said to reflect a policy opposed to restrictive covenants, it is
difficult to understand why the legislature did not enact a statute expressly outlawing such covenants. Where a bill designed to invalidate restrictive covenants
is introduced but is not passed by the legislature it becomes even more difficult
to support the inference of a policy hostile to restrictive covenants from related
statutes.3 4 There are, moreover, important differences between restrictive covenant cases and other types of litigation in which this technique has been used,
whidh would justify even the most liberal court in refusing to invoke "public
policy." In many of the "public policy" cases a decision will affect only the immediate parties to the suit; a later legislative enactment can correct what is believed to be an erroneous opinion of the court. The use of this technique in restrictive covenant cases, however, might have consequences which could not be
readily altered by subsequent legislative action. If a court invalidates a restrictive covenant, it is possible that the neighborhood affected will be unalterably
and completely changed before any action would be taken by the legislature.35
32The court neglected to construe the following provision of the New Jersey law against
discrimination (Fair Employment Practice Act): "Finding and Declaration by Legislature.
The legislature finds and declares the practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants
because of race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry are a matter of concern to the government of the state, and that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the state but menaces the institutions and foundations of a free
democratic state." Since the statute also contained a specific declaration that the opportunity
to obtain employment without discrimination is a civil right, the broad terms of the quoted
declaration suggest that it was intended to serve as a statement of public policy of general application. N.J. Rev. Stat. (i945 Supp.) tit. i8 §§ i8:25-3, x8:25-4.
33 63 Cal. App. 2d 230, 146 P. 2d 720 (1944).
34 See Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants: A Reconsideration of the
Problem, i2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i98, 210 (1945) citing H. B. 563, 63d-Gen. Assembly of Illinois
(1943), 2d S.B. 281, 62d Gen. Assembly of Illinois (1941) which were tabled, as were similar
bills submitted to the 6ist and 62d General Assembly.
3s It is generally conceded that when the first breach is made into the restricted area by a
member of the group barred by the covenant, an almost complete change-over of the neighborhood soon follows. Thus, while an injunction was being prosecuted to force a family of Negroes
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The most persuasive argument against the use of related statutory materials in
the covenant case rests upon the extremely controversial nature of these covenants. It is questionable whether it is the proper function of the courts to establish new rules with respect to rights in land which have serious political and economic aspects and upon which the legislature has refused to act. The controversy that has surrounded the advocacy of fair employment practice legislation
suggests that equally drastic measures with respect to property interests should
be taken only by the legislature. The courts do not provide the best forum for
the hearing of the numerous issues which are involved in a debate over racial
restrictive covenants.36
The attempt to infer public policy from related statutes raises problems similar to those posed by the suggestion that courts exercising equity powers should
look to relevant sociological and background materials in many restrictive
covenant cases as a source of public policy.37 It is argued that the desirability of
enforcing the covenant should be examined in the light of data pertaining to
hardship, population pressures, relative housing facilities, and racial tensions.
This proposal would be ineffective strategy against these covenants in many
situations since it does not afford relief against a covenant solely because there
is discrimination. Furthermore, it is debatable whether a court is equipped to
make the necessary investigation.38 Two recent California decisions in restrictive covenant cases reflect opposite views on the competence of courts to make
such investigations in a private litigation.39
to remove from an otherwise ioo per cent white neighborhood in Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d
869 (App. D.C., 1945), other Negroes moved into the area in sufficient numbers to indicate
that the trend -vas definitely colored, and still other Negroes had purchased within the area
preparatory to occupancy, Mays v. Burgess, 152 F. 2d 123 (App. D.C., '945).
36 It is, of course, doubtful whether efforts to have legislatures invalidate restrictive covenants will be successful in any state in the immediate future. However, it does not follow from
this that a court is the proper forum in which to try these issues.
37 The material which presents a sociological approach to the problem of racial restrictive
covenants is voluminous. See Kahen, op. cit. supra, note 34, at 198; Race Relations in the Nation's Capital, First Annual Report of Citizens Committee on Race Relations (Aug. 26, 1944);
Klutznick, Public Housing Charts Its Course, Survey Graphic (Jan., 1945); Weaver, Racial
Restrictive Housing Covenants, 30 J. of Land and Public Utility Economics 183, i9o
('944); Woof ter, Negro Problem in Cities (1928); Federal Housing Administration, The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities (9.39).
38 See Gellhorn, op. cit supra, note 16, at 685.
39Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 151 P. 2d 260, 267 (1944), where the concurring opinion of Traynor, J.,refers to such social data as pertinent evidence in a restrictive covenant case
and states that a trial court should be obliged to determine whether there was a need for Negro
expansion into the restricted area as a result of a shortage of available housing facilities in the
present colored district. But see Stone v. Jones, 66 Cal. App. 2d 264, 152 P. 2d. 19, 22 (1944),
where the court said "Changes, or the likelihood thereof, incident to the growth of a community, may create or forecast perplexing social problems, but such problems, from the very
nature of things, cannot be solved by the courts in the process of litigation of a purely private
nature." The court, therefore, declined to make such an examination on the ground that it was
a legislative task.
In Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869, 874, 876 (App. D.C., I945), Edgerton, J., dissenting,
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One may expect to see an increasing use of the public policy argument in restrictive covenant cases in those states which have recently enacted legislation
against other forms of racial discrimination. While the technique employed by
the Ontario court does not appear to be readily adaptable to the American legal
system, the decision does constitute an invitation to those state courts which are
unsympathetic to restrictive covenants to limit the influence of the Corrigan
decision.
LEGALITY OF WAGE READJUSTMENT PLANS UNDER
THE OVERTIME PROVISION OF THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The most troublesome question which the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938'
has presented to the courts has been the interpretation of that part of Section
7(a) of the Act which provides that the employee shallbe paid for overtime work
at not less than one and one-half times "the regular rate at which he is employed. ' ' 2In attempting to comply with this.provision of the Act the employer
is confronted with several problems. In the first place he wishes to maintain his
wages and hours at their former over-all level, so that his.labor costs will not be
increased by compliance. In the second place he wishes to avoid the necessity
for spreading work brought about by extra labor cost for extra hours, since it
may be uneconomical for him to reallocate the work in his plant for an increased
force of workers, all of whom work only regular time; likewise labor unions
whose members would suffer from reduced take-home pay by such a result
might find it to their interest to support plans designed to avoid it.3 And in the
took the position that the court should consider evidence of the notorious dearth of housing
for Negroes in the District of Columbia in making its decision whether to enforce a restrictive
covenant. The same judge took a similar position in his dissent in Mays v. Burgess, 152 F. 2d
123,

127 (App. D.C., 1946).
Stat. io6o (1938), 29 U.S.C.A.

126,

152

§§

201-219 (1942).

The full text of Section 7(a) is as follows: No employer shall, except as otherwise provided
in this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce(i)for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the effective
date of this section,
(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second year from such date, or
(3)for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year from
such date,
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above
specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
3 The Act was designed primarily for the relief of unorganized, unskilled, and unemployed
workers. Presidential messages, 1941 Wage & Hour Man. 747 (I937), and 82 Cong. Rec. ii
(1937). Its passage met with opposition from some labor unions, particularly the American
Federation of Labor, which in 1937 went on record opposing it. N.Y. Times, p. I, col. 2
(May 24, 1937), because it feared that the minimum wage would tend to become the maximum wage. It was estimated by the Department of Labor that by 1945 upwards of i,oooooo
workers would receive wage increases because of the law, but 4,000,000 would have their hours
2

